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DISCLAIMER 
 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the 
United States Government.  Neither the United States Government nor any agency 
thereof, nor any employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any 
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any 
information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not 
infringe privately owned rights.  Reference herein to any specific commercial product, 
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not 
necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the 
United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of the authors 
expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect that of those of the United States 
Government or any agency thereof. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
 The objective of the project is to build a multi-product ash beneficiation plant at 
Kentucky Utilities 2,200-MW Ghent Generating Station, located in Carroll County, 
Kentucky. Phase 1 was completed successfully, but the project did not continue on to 
Phase 2 due to withdrawal of CEMEX from the project. Attempts at replacing CEMEX 
were not successful. Problematic to the continuation of the project was its location in the 
Ohio Valley which is oversupplied and has low prices for fly ash and the change in 
CEMEX priorities due to merger and acquisitions.  Thus, CAER concurred with the DOE 
to conclude the project at the end of Budget Period 1, March 31, 2007. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
 The project area is located in Carroll County, Kentucky, approximately one mile 
northeast of Ghent, Kentucky. The lower ash pond is situated immediately adjacent to 
U.S. Highway 42 on the southwest corner of the Ghent power plant site. Disposal of ash 
into the 120-acre pond began when the Ghent power plant became operational in 1973 
and continued over a period of 20 years until the upper ash pond became operational in 
1993.  
 This quarterly report focuses on the results of attempts to replace CEMEX in the 
project with another participant after they withdrew from the project.  Several ash 
marketers and other companies in related industries were contacted and presentations 
were made to the relevant groups. We were not successful in replacing CEMEX in the 
time frame available. The knowledge gained from the Phase I experience as well as this 
effort was invaluable however.  
 
 The project did not advance beyond Phase I for a number of reasons. First, 
CEMEX priorities had changed during the project due to internal reorganization and the 
acquisition of an ash marketer that had prior existing ash beneficiation technology; also 
the CEMEX/MRT marketing group was brought in too late for the results of the study to 
have an impact on product strategies.  Of particular importance was the nature of the 
local market, which is heavily oversupplied and under priced. Other factors include the 
production of the multiple products which several companies thought made the project 
more complex than was desirable and the size of the project, which may have been too 
small for the complexities of the CCPI program.    
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 As of the end of Phase I, CEMEX had decided to opt out of the project. The 
reason given was that they did not consider the market conditions to be sufficient to 
justify the risk associated with the project.    
 
 Their assessment of the local market for pozzolan suggested that it is already 
oversupplied and undervalued and additional supplies will only further deteriorate market 
pricing.  The local pozzolan Fly Ash market (fly ash used as a partial replacement for 
Portland Cement) has 500,000 tpy more supply than the current demand and Unit 2 at 
Trimble County will add about 125,000 additional tons to that surplus supply in 2008.  
The local price is $10 to $14 per ton.  The main competition for Ghent would be the 
LG&E Trimble County Station. The ash from this plant is marketed by CEMEX/MRT. 
 
 Consideration of exporting the pozzolan to more distant markets was more 
promising but still problematic. Most markets outside of Florida are adequately supplied, 
as of now, by local producers.  Significant quantities of pozzolan are shipped into the 
Florida market. It was concluded however that the markets that supply Florida are 
oversupplied and a beneficiated pozzolan would have a competitive disadvantage in the 
longer term.  
 
 The markets for the ultra fine fly ash (UFFA) were somewhat different.  There is 
some UFFA on the market and the State of Texas DOT has some relevant specifications. 
It was considered to be a niche product with limited demand. Competing materials 
include silica fume and metakaolin. The total demand in the United States for ultra fine 
pozzolans is in the range of 100,000 tpy, and that is currently equal to the supply.  The 
current price for ultra fine pozzolans including UFFA is in the range of $200 to $300 per 
ton. They concluded that there was no reason to expect demand to depart from its 
historical relationship to Portland cement consumption.  In addition it was noted that 
CEMEX/MRT did not have sales experience in for this kind of material and considerable 
effort would have to be expended to hire and train sales staff.  
 
 
ACTIVITIES DURING THE QUARTER 
 
 The UK CAER proposed replacing CEMEX on the project and/or possibly 
moving the project to another site.  The time frame agreed upon for the effort included a 
6 month not cost project extension which expired on March 30, 2007. Meetings were held 
with both large and small fly ash marketers as well processors and marketers of 
specialized materials such as polymer fillers and high performance grouts.  A great deal 
was learned about the market for ash materials and impediments to developing new 
markets. The conclusions reached from this experience are presented here.  
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LESSONS LEARNED 
 
1. Corporate Strategies,  Priorities and Organization Change. Often rapidly. Cemex’s 
participation in the project was initiated by a technical group within the company before 
the acquisition of an ash marketer (MRT).  The ash marketer already had contracted 
technology for ash beneficiation and therefore the need to acquire new technologies in 
the area of ash beneficiation was less urgent. During the period of the study Cemex made 
a multi-billion dollar purchase of another company (RMC) and reorganized itself. We 
lost the management team that started the project to another division and someone wholly 
new was put in charge of the project.   
 
Considering the magnitude of the changes made, it would have been wise to pause and 
call a meeting all of the participants to review the objectives of the effort and renew the 
buy in of all parties. 
   
2. The Corporate Marketing Group was Brought in Too Late. Marketing people are face 
with issues of moving material in the short term.  New product markets take time to 
develop.  The marketing group was not prepared to examine the viability of the entire 
slate of products, which could have included specialized materials such as oil field 
cements, grouts etc. 
 
Bringing in the Cemex/MRT marketing group at the end of the project was a mistake.  
Dialog could have been productive in both the technical program and the marketing 
study. 
 
 3. The Project May Have Been too Complex for a Single Owner/Operator.  Several 
corporate groups told us that a multi-product slate could be marketed, but only in the 
longer term. It was suggested that additional products should be added sequentially only 
after a primary market was established for one or two products.  Also, no single entity 
was comfortable selling into multiple markets, such as specialty cement or polymer filler 
and the concrete ready mix industry. Also the personnel and expertise in operating the 
processing plant was not present. 
 
 A plant operator with knowledge of marketing other materials such as polymer filler, in 
addition to a pozzolan marketer, would have been of value. Also, Cemex had no 
experience actually operating this kind of plant. The participation of someone more 
familiar with this kind of process was lacking and probably needed. 
 
4. Site Selection is Critical.  After many hours of discussion, at least in regard to 
marketing products for the ready mix concrete industry, it is better to have a marginal ash 
in a strong market that the best ash available in a weakly priced market. 
 
The site was chosen with regard to the needs of the utility not the needs of the market. 
The market proved to be more critical in the economic viability of the project. 
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5. DOE Involvement May Not Be a Critical Factor For This Project.  The dollar value of 
the project may have been too small for participation in the U.S. DOE CCPI program.   
As a result, none of the potential project participants viewed the involvement of the U.S. 
DOE as a critical factor in their investment. Because of the payback clause, U.S. DOE 
was regarded as a “friendly banker” and not as a reducer of risk. To explain, all of the 
parties which we talked to regarded the government’s participation as adding to 
“overhead”.  The added burden to insure that all accounts and records meet with 
government standards and needs, is an example of this.  The savings on interests for a $4 
million dollar investment was not seen as offsetting the added complexity of the 
government’s participation.    
 
The U.S.DOE may wish to consider  a minimum $ size for CCPI projects and awards. 
